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ESSAY
PLEASANT GROVE V. SUMMUM: LOSING THE BATTLE TO WIN
THE WAR
Ian Bartrum *

I

N February, the Supreme Court announced its unanimous decision in
a case that represents the first step in a well calculated attack on the
conservative wing’s efforts to conflate Establishment Clause doctrine
with Free Speech analysis. The case, Pleasant Grove City, Utah v.
Summum, pitted a Salt Lake City church headed by Summum Ra against
the city of Pleasant Grove in a fight over monuments displayed in a
public park. 1 For over thirty years, a monument of the Ten
Commandments—originally donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles—
has stood in the city’s Pioneer Park. In 2003, and again in 2005,
Summum asked Pleasant Grove also to display a monument dedicated to
the “Seven Aphorisms of Summum” on park grounds.2 The city rejected
Summum’s request, claiming that monuments in the park must have
some significant connection to Pleasant Grove’s civic history. Summum,
however, argued that, by opening Pioneer Park to privately donated
monuments, the city has created a public forum for free expression
purposes and cannot now discriminate against donations based on their
content. In a forceful display of unanimity from a Court that might have
fractured along a number of doctrinal lines, Summum lost—for now.
Samuel Alito’s majority opinion makes the decision out as a
straightforward application of the government speech rule, which
* Irving S. Ribicoff Fellow in Law, Yale Law School.
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Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
Id. at 1129–30.
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permits the state to formulate and express its own opinions without also
having to present any and all others. In one court’s words, if “authorities
place a statute [sic] of Ulysses S. Grant in [a] park, the First Amendment
does not require them also to install a statue of Robert E. Lee.”3 This
rule hinges, of course, on whether or not it is in fact the government
speaking; the doctrine does not, by definition, apply to private speech
that takes place on public grounds. Thus, much of the argument in
Pleasant Grove centered on whether the city has “adopted” or
“effectively controlled” the message of the Fraternal Order of Eagles’
monument by displaying it in Pioneer Park. Were this truly the only
issue in play, however, it would seem that Pleasant Grove had an easy
way out: simply pass an ordinance or install a placard adopting the Ten
Commandments monument as its own speech. This would have removed
all doubt as to whether the monument falls under the government speech
rule—but Pleasant Grove resolutely refused to take either action. Why?
The obvious answer is that such an explicit endorsement of the
Decalogue would raise serious Establishment Clause concerns. Although
Alito’s opinion studiously avoids this question, its long-term
significance was not lost on others on the Court. While Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas blustered in concurrence that “[t]he city ought not
fear that today’s victory has propelled it from the Free Speech Clause
frying pan into the Establishment Clause fire,”4 John Paul Stevens and
Ruth Ginsburg seemed quietly pleased—perhaps even confident—about
the potential future implications: “For even if the Free Speech Clause
neither restricts nor protects government speech, government speakers
are bound by the Constitution’s other proscriptions, including those
supplied by the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses.”5 To
understand what is really at stake here—to put Scalia’s Gertrudian
protest and Stevens’ Machiavellian calm in context—it is worth taking a
brief look at the unsettled state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
When it incorporated the Establishment Clause against the states in
1947, the Court both adopted a doctrine of state “neutrality” towards
religion and made an explicit choice about the practical shape this
neutrality would take: “Neither a state nor the Federal government can . .
. pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one

3

PETA v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Pleasant Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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religion over another.”6 To be neutral, then, the state must exclude all
religion from government speech or aid programs. This “exclusive”
conception of neutrality met with immediate opposition, however, from
those who claimed that the doctrine actually establishes a secular
viewpoint at the expense of all others. And so, just five years later, a
different vision of neutrality briefly captured a majority of the Court:
“When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with
religious authorities . . . . it then respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To
hold that it may not would . . . . be preferring those who believe in no
religion over those who do believe.”7 But this “inclusive” version of
neutrality—which sees the state as neutral when it includes or
accommodates all religious views equally—did not long hold sway. A
decade later the Court excluded nondenominational prayer from public
schools, 8 and it has since applied exclusivism to strike down moments
of silence, nondenominational graduate prayers, public funding for
Catholic school field trips, and tax benefits to parochial school parents.9
But inclusivism has remained alive—simmering just below the
surface in Potter Stewart’s dissents in the school prayer decisions—and
has reemerged, cloaked in free expression robes, in a series of cases
running from Widmar v. Vincent, through Lamb’s Chapel v. Center for
Moriches Union Free School District and Rosenberger v. University of
Virginia, to Good News Club v. Milford Central School. 10 In these
decisions the Court has held that, the Establishment Clause
notwithstanding, the Free Speech Clause prevents the government from
discriminating against groups with a religious viewpoint when allocating
resources for use as, or in, a public forum—so long as the government
itself does not endorse a particular religious message. In this way,
inclusivists on the Court have begun to chip away at the exclusivist wall
of separation by suggesting that some forms of exclusivism are
tantamount to a denial of free speech. While not unnoticed, these efforts
6

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1952).
8
See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
9
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
10
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb’s
Chapel v. Ctr. for Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
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have remained underpublicized; but they continue to present puzzling
doctrinal problems. Summum’s near certain follow-up appeal on
Establishment Clause grounds—which Scalia is at unseemly pains to
prevent—threatens to expose these problems in the months ahead.
From the outside looking in, this two-step litigation tactic has the
appearance of a well conceived divide-and-conquer strategy. If the Good
News approach has been to muddy the Establishment water with Free
Speech analysis, Pleasant Grove seeks to clarify each clause and its
derivative doctrine separately. The first step forces the Court to
acknowledge the true parameters of Free Speech in a public forum; thus
the recent decision reaffirms that a public entity that sponsors a
particular viewpoint—while excluding others—must actually endorse
that viewpoint as “government speech.” The second step, presumably,
will ask the Court to decide whether the Establishment Clause permits
“government speech” that presents a particular religious viewpoint. This
is precisely the doctrinal problem that Thomas papers over in his Good
News opinion, cryptically suggesting that, “it is not clear whether a
State’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would
justify viewpoint discrimination.”11 It is this very clarity that Pleasant
Grove would seem to demand. By taking these issues apart and
resolving them separately, Summum’s advocates may yet demonstrate
that Scalia and Thomas cannot have their constitutional cake and eat it
too: If there is room at the public forum for the Good News Club, there
must also be room for Summum.
The view from the inside must seem equally troubling, at least
judging from Chief Justice John Roberts’s very first question to the
petitioners at oral argument: “[Y]ou’re really just picking your poison,
aren’t you? I mean, the more you say that the monument is Government
speech to get out of the . . . Free Speech Clause, the more it seems to me
you’re walking into a trap under the Establishment Clause.”12 Scalia
expressed similar unease with the respondents: “You will say just the
opposite when you come back here to challenge the Ten
Commandments monument . . . on Establishment Clause grounds. You
will say something like this: Anybody who comes into this park and sees
this monument owned by the Government, on Government land, will

11

Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct.
1125 (2009) (No. 07-665).
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think that the Government is endorsing the message.”13 Indeed, by
invoking the government speech rule based on these facts, the Court
would effectively kick out the doctrinal leg upon which the
Widmar/Good News cases stand—the idea that the state does not
endorse religious speech simply by opening its doors to religious
viewpoints on an equal basis. The only Establishment defense then left
to the inclusivists—derived from 2005’s Van Orden v. Perry—is to
argue that the state is only endorsing the Ten Commandments’
“historical meaning” to Pleasant Grove; not the religious message.14
This is the tack that Scalia has preemptively taken in concurrence:
“Even accepting the narrowest reading of the narrowest opinion
necessary to the judgment in Van Orden, there is little basis to
distinguish the monument in this case . . . .”15 But, in truth, this is a
flimsy doctrine fraught with peril; it transparently prefers well
established or “historically significant” religions—likely to be local
majorities—to newer minority groups. And it is unclear that this frail
fiction can survive recent turnover on the bench—neither Alito nor
Roberts took the opportunity to sign on here.
Admittedly, it is difficult to imagine the Court overturning a case
decided just four years ago, but—Scalia’s wishful thinking
notwithstanding—a direct repudiation of Van Orden hardly seems
necessary. Stephen Breyer’s concurrence was the swing vote in that
decision (the aforementioned “narrowest opinion”) and in it he made
clear that the fundamental inquiry in such “borderline cases” must be
whether the outcome “assure[s] the fullest possible scope of religious
liberty and tolerance for all,” and prevents “divisiveness based upon
religion that promotes social conflict . . . .”16 He concluded that the
particular context of the monument at issue in Van Orden made its
message “predominantly secular” and “unlikely to prove divisive,” thus
placing it narrowly “on the permissible side of the constitutional line . .
. .” 17 Given the peculiar facts and implications of Pleasant Grove,
however, Breyer’s fundamental inquiry could easily yield different
results. Indeed, Scalia’s recent concurrence practically begs a troubling
hypothetical: What if the city had accepted Summum’s monument, and
13

Id. at 47.
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005).
15
Pleasant Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1140 (Scalia, J., concurring).
16
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698, 700 (Breyer, J., concurring).
17
Id. at 702, 704.
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now faced an Establishment Clause challenge from a local Christian
group? Given the decisive importance Scalia wants to place on a
monument’s historical meaning or significance, such a challenge would
seem likely to succeed. But a doctrine that finds the Ten
Commandments constitutional, yet would hold the Ten Commandments
plus the Seven Aphorisms unconstitutional, hardly seems to assure the
fullest scope of “tolerance for all”18 —nor, truth be told, does it mesh
particularly well with Establishment inclusivism. And because such an
approach actually threatens to encourage religious divisiveness, it does
not seem sympathetic to Breyer’s calculus. For now, the once and future
swing voter was careful not to give anything away, saying in
concurrence only that we must treat the “‘government speech’ doctrine
[as] a rule of thumb, not a rigid category.”19
Thus Pleasant Grove, in both its current and future manifestations,
seems poised to cut at least part way through the now tangled strands of
First Amendment doctrine. In what is likely a deliberate, two-step
litigation strategy, Summum has brought the Court to a potentially
transformative Establishment crossroads. For his part, David Souter,
another pivotal voter on this issue, clearly sees the coming storm:
“[While] Establishment Clause issues have been neither raised nor
briefed before us, there is no doubt that this case and its government
speech claim has been litigated by the parties with one eye on the
Establishment Clause. The interaction between the ‘government speech
doctrine’ and Establishment Clause principles has not, however, begun
to be worked out.” 20 This call to begin “work[ing] out” the relevant
Establishment principles certainly tempers Scalia’s loud confidence in
Van Orden, and, when combined with Stevens and Ginsburg’s quiet
contentment and Roberts and Alito’s abstinence, Souter’s concurrence
may signal a sea change in favor of Establishment exclusivists. At the
very least, Summum Ra (and perhaps others) will have the pleasure of
seeing the Court’s conservatives squirm through a doctrinal minefield of
their own making.

18

Id. 700.
Pleasant Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1140 (Breyer, J. concurring).
20
Id. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring).
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